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* Judge McKee was Chief Judge at the time this appeal was submitted.  Judge 
McKee completed his term as Chief Judge on September 30, 2016. 
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O P I N I O N* 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:  
Bernard McLaughlin appeals from the District Court’s order entering Judgment 
against him in the amount of $45,347.89 in an action commenced by the National 
Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan Board of Trustees (“the Plan”). We will affirm. 
 McLaughlin was injured in an all-terrain vehicle accident in January 2009. The 
Plan extended him approximately $47,590.24 in benefits for his medical treatment costs. 
McLaughlin also filed a claim against a third party and subsequently recovered monies 
by way of settlement. He did not assert medical expenses as part of the claim against the 
third party. The Plan then sought reimbursement from McLaughlin from the settlement 
proceeds according to the following Plan provision: 
The Plan has a right to first reimbursement out of any recovery. Acceptance 
of benefits from the Plan for an injury or illness by a covered person, 
without any further action by the Plan and/or the covered person, 
constitutes an agreement that any amounts recovered from another party by 
award, judgment, settlement or otherwise, and regardless of how the 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
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proceeds are characterized, will promptly be applied first to reimburse the 
Plan in full for benefits advanced by the Plan due to the injury or illness.  
 
A19a.  
 
The Plan subsequently brought suit in the United State District Court for the 
District of New Jersey and sought “the imposition of a constructive trust and/or equitable 
lien over identifiable funds in the possession and/or control of [McLaughlin]. No money 
damages [were] sought . . . .” Complaint at 2, ¶4. McLaughlin urged that he was not 
obligated to reimburse the Plan because he had not recovered money for medical bills in 
the settlement. The District Judge granted summary judgment for the Plan on January 24, 
2014 and opined that “[s]ince the Plan’s language is clear and the agreement controls, 
Defendant must reimburse [the Plan] from the Settlement.” Bd. of Trs. of Nat’l Elevator 
Indus. Health Benefit Plan v. McLaughlin, No. 12-4322, 2014 WL 284431, at *4 (D.N.J. 
Jan. 24, 2014).1 
 Thereafter, in December 2015, the Plan sent a letter to the District Judge noting, 
“We now wish to file a lien against the Defendant for the unpaid medical lien; however 
the order and judgment from the District Court granting summary judgment in favor of 
[the Plan] does not mention a sum certain.” A26a. It then goes on to state that the 
“current claim amount is $45,347.89.” A26a. It also noted that it advised McLaughlin’s 
counsel of the current amount by letter dated October 8, 2015 and had not received any 
                                              
1 McLaughlin appealed from this order, and we affirmed in a non-precedential 
opinion. See Bd. of Trs. of the Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan v. McLaughlin, 
590 F. App’x 154 (3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1405 (2015). 
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objection. A26a, A61a. On December 21, 2015, the District Court ordered that judgment 
in that amount be entered in favor of the Plan. 
 McLaughlin now makes several arguments in this appeal, but principally 
challenges the District Court’s entry of a “new order for judgment” under Rule 60, 
McLaughlin Br. 6, notwithstanding the previous “final order” of the District Court. He 
also urges that ERISA does not authorize entry of a money judgment. Our analysis 
depends in part on how we should characterize what occurred in the District Court and in 
part on the state of the law at the time judgment was entered.  
 It should be noted that McLaughlin originally argued in the District Court that 
since the funds he received had been dissipated, i.e., spent by him, there could be no 
enforceable lien. The District Court rejected that argument based on our opinion in Funk 
v. Cigna, 648 F.3d 182 (3d Cir. 2011), in which we held that a lien-by-agreement can be 
enforced notwithstanding the dissipation of the specific fund to which the lien attached. 
See Bd. of Trs. of Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health Benefit Plan, 2014 WL 284431, at *2 n.2. 
McLaughlin did not appeal that aspect of the original ruling in the District Court in his 
earlier appeal. We note that Funk was clearly controlling at that time. 
 Here, we must decide what the District Court was doing when it entered judgment 
in the amount of $45,347.89 on December 21, 2015. McLaughlin asserts that it was 
entering a personal judgment that is not a valid “equitable remedy” authorized by ERISA. 
The Plan, on the other hand, contends that the District Court had granted equitable relief 
as requested in its complaint and thus was simply monetizing the amount of the current 
lien claim. 
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 We think the Plan has the better argument. While it would seem that such a money 
judgment would originally be deemed a legal judgment prohibited by ERISA, the District 
Court was acting pursuant to our opinion in Funk which permitted it to enforce a lien-by-
agreement against property other than the res to which the lien attached. It follows 
logically that the District Court needed to indicate the amount of the lien in order to do 
so. That, together with the underlying equitable relief requested by the Plan, causes us to 
view the judgment at issue here as one that merely monetizes the lien and does not run 
afoul of ERISA.  
 The parties acknowledge that our ruling in Funk has been abrogated by the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Montanile v. Bd. of Trs. of Nat’l Elevator Indus. Health 
Benefit Plan, 136 S. Ct. 651 (2016), which clarified that in order to be equitable, the lien 
must attach to a specific fund, and if that specific fund is dissipated, relief against the 
debtor is no longer equitable. McLaughlin asked the District Court to vacate its order 
under Rule 60(b) and apply Montanile, and on appeal before us he contends the District 
Court erred in refusing to do so. We reject this argument and will affirm on this issue as 
well. “[I]ntervening changes in the law rarely justify relief from a final judgment.” Cox v. 
Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 121 (3d Cir. 2014). Moreover, McLaughlin has not presented the 
extraordinary circumstances that would warrant such relief. 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order. 
 
